This brings us to the most signi cant episode in the national home market until recent times: the sharp home price increases associated with the end of World War II. It is clear that there were large real home price increases at least in the big cities at this time, although the exact magnitude of the increases may not have been well measured. Home prices did not overshoot their new postwar equilibrium, and they did not have to come crashing back down.
Newspaper accounts of the housing market did not use the term housing bubble, nor did they feature stories of crazy homebuyers buying just about anything to stay ahead of the curve, like those we were reading about in the early s.
The story that one gleans from the newspapers just after World War II is quite di erent. Government restrictions had severely limited the supply of new homes during World War II.
After the war, returning soldiers wanted to start families; they were about to launch the Baby Boom. Prices of existing homes actually started increasing after , before the war was over, probably because people anticipated the shortage of housing that was to follow.
But, even though demand soared after the war, there was no real buying panic, as the conventional wisdom of the time was that construction would soon greatly increase the stock of available homes.
This major government subsidy did not go away, and it helped lead to permanently higher home prices. But it did so in the context of the solidarity of the American people, and it never ignited a speculative atmosphere. Other people simply found a temporary place to live and waited for the expected decline in home prices which never came or for their savings to increase to the point that they could a ord housing. People must have remembered that episode in the aftermath of World War II.
A widespread worry then that the Great Depression of the s would reappear after the stimulus of the war ended further de ected any worries that home prices would soar. It appears that people were for the most part not afraid of being priced out of the market, and that they did not fully anticipate the home price increases to come. They counted on new construction to prevent any severe price rise—and indeed, construction of new homes rose from , homes built in the United States in to 1,, homes built in Even though this massive increase in supply did not stop price increases, the popular understanding seems to have been that it would.
It has been di erent in this century. We are increasingly feeling worried and vulnerable, and the market volatility that ares up from time to time, in both the stock market and the housing market, re ects this.
Before the post boom, there were a couple of false starts failed launches, so to speak , one in the late s and one in the late s. These were actually regional booms that did not extend so much to the nation as a whole. The s boom was mostly con ned to California, and the s boom occurred on both the west coast and the east coast. Prices in Boston and Los Angeles have gone through two dramatic swings, and at the end of the sample period shown, prices were soaring. But, in sharp contrast, prices in Miami and Phoenix completely missed the rst of these two booms.
Boston held much of its value increase—in , remaining over twice its real value—but Miami and Phoenix hardly changed at all in real value between and Consumer Price Index, U. It is commonly said that there is no national home market in the United States, only regional markets. There is something to that statement, but it is not completely true and appears to be getting less true. While many markets in the United States had been highly stable and trendy, there were enough markets that were moving rapidly by the mids that the national series began to show signs of life, and it continues to be lively.
The period of home price increase starting in in the United States was concentrated in some states and metropolitan areas, and where it was concentrated, there were many stories about the psychological correlates of the boom. Stories abounded in the U. But, in other cities, where there was not a history of home price volatility, there were few such stories, and investors were relatively less reactive to home price changes.
Each home price index is de ated by a Consumer Price Index of the respective country. Each index was multiplied by a constant to be in where possible. It is in the big glamorous cities and associated regions of the world that these bubbles tend to happen.
Taken together, these regions can experience a massive boom. It appears that for these cities, there is indeed more than a national market for real estate. There is an international market, as Figure 3.
This gure shows real home prices up to in Boston, London, New York, Paris, Shanghai, Sydney, and Vancouver, all of them glamorous international cities, and for the entire world. The similarity among the price paths for these cities is striking really stunning price increases both in the late s and after the late s, with stagnant or falling prices in between , as is the similarity of popular stories of exaggerated excitement about and speculation in homes.
And these were not the only prominent cities undergoing spectacular housing booms in the early s. Whatever it was that drove this excitement, it could cross vast oceans. This notable trend was part of what prompted my warning in that we were in the midst of a housing bubble of unprecedented proportions. Since , the picture has become more mixed.
Some cities continued their upward trend, with only small retrenchments. Others fell from their lofty heights and have yet to return. Many have seen a leveling-o in price increases. The cities shown in the gure were selected for this plot based on their newsworthiness and volatility in price movements. The Global House Price Index, produced by the International Monetary Fund for 52 countries around the world, shows much less volatility, and indeed, some other world cities showed a very di erent pattern.
For example, real residential urban land prices in Tokyo more than doubled between and , at the same time as the s boom in the cities shown in the gure, but then embarked on a steady downtrend, showing no signs of the boom after , and falling by nearly half by We will try to understand this similarity later in this book.
It is true that for the United States as a whole, real home prices were almost twice as high in as in , but all of that increase occurred in two brief periods: the time right after World War II with the rst increases occurring in the early s, just before the war ended and a period that appears to re ect a lagged response to the s stock market boom or a response to its boom and crash , with the rst signs of increase occurring in Other than those two periods, real home prices overall have been mostly at or declining.
Why then do so many people have the impression that home prices have done so well? I think that, since homes are relatively infrequent purchases, people still remember the prior purchase price of a home from long ago and are surprised at the di erence between then when prices, including consumer prices in general, were lower and now. Thus, people do not have long-run comparisons thrust upon them for stocks as they do for houses. The appearance is that the investment in the house did extremely well.
Moreover, part of the increase should be attributed to a sequence of investments in the house or the neighborhood that improved its quality. About the only time that our attention is called to such long-term changes in asset value is when we hear stories about houses, and we may be over- impressed; most of us are not good at evaluating such stories. To try to check further whether these data, showing so little real appreciation of homes, might be in error, I asked economists I know to direct me to other very long-term home price indices that might provide some independent evidence about the long-term behavior of such prices.
I was able to locate a few other long-term home price indices, and, even though they are not for the full time period or for an entire country, they may provide some more clues about long- term trends. Their median reported value in real in ation-corrected terms increased by 2.
A growth rate of 2. However, the Census data take no account of the increased quality and size of homes as does the index shown in Figure 3. There have been big changes in homes since Note, for example, that in , according to the U. The standard of living has improved massively since then, and surely homes are a lot better now. With the U. The smaller and lower quality homes of have largely been torn down over the years, and so we are likely to have a mistaken impression from the older homes we observe today that homes of long ago were comparable to homes of today.
There is a remarkable high-quality index from to of prices of houses along the Herengracht, one of the old canals of Amsterdam. According to Professor Piet Eichholtz of the University of Amsterdam, this area is a good place to construct a home price index, since the houses there have remained remarkably unchanged over the centuries and since home price sale data have been meticulously recorded and preserved.
The index shows quite a number of ups and downs in home prices over this period—as one might expect from the city that gave us the tulip mania, the remarkable boom in the price of tulips in the early s. The market for these homes was certainly volatile. But when this index is corrected for in ation over this whole period, we see that there was not much overall home price increase. From to the Herengracht annual real price increase was only 0. Real home prices did roughly double, but took nearly years to do so.
This way he was able to purge the price index of the e ects of quality change. He found that, from to , the real increase in the price per square foot of land was 3. This is a much higher rate of price increase than is suggested by the price index shown in the plot, exceeding the growth rate of real GDP. Hoyt too found dramatic increases in land prices. For example, his data show that prices of lots per front foot on State Street and Michigan Avenue major downtown addresses rose 5.
Boston and Chicago are not typical of U. The success of these cities was a local surprise that people could not have predicted with con dence. It compressed within a single century the population growth of Paris for twenty centuries. Re ections from casual observation ought to convince us that homes have not appreciated signi cantly over the decades. People are living in larger homes than they were decades ago and are spread out over more properties; more people are living in a house by themselves over the decades, if not during the slow years just after the —9 nancial crisis; more children have been moving out and starting their own homes rather than living with their parents until marriage.
This suggests that in the United States, real home price growth must have been less than real per capita disposable income growth, which was 2. The bottom line appears to be that, while there is some uncertainty about the actual path of home prices, most of the evidence points to disappointingly low average rates of real appreciation of most homes.
The reader may be puzzled that these data show so little evidence of an increase in real home prices in the United States over so long a period.
Actually, the theoretical argument that home prices can be expected to appreciate faster than consumer prices in general is not strong. Technological progress in the increasingly mechanized construction industry may proceed faster than technological progress in other sectors, such as the important service sector.
If new homes can be built more cheaply, then the price of homes should tend to fall relative to other prices to re ect that. Public attention seems to focus most on congested big cities that have little land available for building, and where land prices can get very high.
But most cities have abundant land. Developers who eye these abundant-land cities for prospective sites do sometimes complain about the shortage of land there, and about barriers erected by conservationists and neighborhood associations, but what they are really talking about is a shortage of lots in the prime areas where they would most like to build. These abundant-land cities show long-run price paths that never deviate too far from building costs. This should come as no surprise.
If ever home prices were to far exceed the cost of construction, there would be an incentive for builders to supply more houses, and a steady increase in supply would continue until the extra supply depressed price back down to cost.
The situation in these stable cities ought to be considered typical of much of the United States. The land on which homes are built is of course limited: except for a few projects to reclaim land from the sea, they are not making any more land.
According to the census, urban land area was only 3. However, there is little empty land available to build on in Los Angeles or Boston or, for that matter, in London or Sydney. And yet the same safety valve ought to operate there to prevent home prices from rising too far, at least if people were rational and far-seeing.
This safety valve tends, in the long term, to prevent the price of homes from rising too much in real in ation-corrected terms and to burst bubbles that have in ated too far. The safety valve is more e ective in cities where buildable land is abundant nearby, but it is also e ective in cities far from buildable land, because people and businesses will, if home prices rise high enough, move far away, even leaving an area completely.
The problem is that people in glamorous regions often tend to believe that land prices, already a signi cant component of home value there, will keep going up and up. Surely, they think, there is some advantage to living in those areas.
People do enjoy the prestige of living in an area where celebrities live, and they also bene t from the business opportunities there. It is easy for residents there to imagine that more and more people are thinking similarly, and that they will continue to bid up real estate prices in their city.
This is irrational exuberance in the context of real estate. But, in reality, if home prices get su ciently high in a city relative to the income of the people who live there, and thus make it di cult to a ord a decent home, people start taking a hard look at these assumptions. The fact is that the prestige one derives from simply living in a glamorous city is not very signi cant.
And although individual cities may have reputations tied up with speci c businesses, with a little imagination one sees that other centers in the same businesses are constantly being set up, like the North Carolina Research Triangle set up in former tobacco elds. These centers eventually cause corporate relocators to draw population away from older centers to these new centers, thereby relieving upward pressure on real estate prices in the older centers.
Beyond this, very high home prices create political pressures for the easing of land-use restrictions. Eventually there is an increase in supply of homes as for example in high-rise apartments in the glamorous cities themselves. Thus, in glamorous speculative cities, there has been a tendency for home prices to rise and to crash, but to show little long-term trend. Prices rise while people are optimistic, but forces are set in motion for them to crash when they get too high. It is striking to note from Figure 3.
Based on these trends, owner-occupied housing is looking like a bad long-term investment relative to the stock market: despite the occasional volatility of real estate, nationally it has o ered practically no capital gains for long-term investors. But one must remember the implicit dividends that one receives from living in a home, that is, the value of the shelter and other services provided by a home.
These dividends are untaxed. It is often said correctly that there is a tax advantage to owning rather than renting.
For this reason, most people are well advised to buy rather than rent the homes they live in. Another reason to buy rather than rent is that the rental contract carries with it intrinsic moral hazard problems: the renter cannot be given proper incentives to maintain the property as would a homeowner. There is no accurate measure of the tax-free implicit dividends in the form of housing bene ts that housing provides to compare with the usually taxable dividends paid on stocks, nor of the costs of maintenance that must be o set against the dividends homes provide.
This psychic bene t is not the same as the rent one can charge on a home, since renters are people in substantially di erent circumstances. Homeowners can change their minds from one day to the next about these psychic bene ts. Moreover, these psychic dividends are not directly proportional to the amount one invested in the home, as are the dividends on stocks; if one buys more house than one needs, one may realize a negative psychic dividend from maintaining too much property.
Thus, there is really no way that one can say authoritatively which has been the better investment historically, homes or stocks. The answer di ers across individuals, and is ultimately a matter of taste and circumstance.
But individual homeowners have no clarity on this point and can change their opinions from time to time about the advantages of investing in housing. We will see evidence of such changes later in this book. Irrational Exuberance Then and Now My research assistants and I have seen some clues to the changing nature of public thinking regarding real estate speculation over the years. Our reading of contemporary English-language newspaper and magazine accounts of real estate markets since the late nineteenth century has con rmed such changes.
We have found relatively little talk about anything that could be considered national bubbles in home prices until the last decades of the twentieth century. Instead there was a tendency to stress that building costs were the ultimate determinant of home prices. Articles often tended to talk about shortages of homes for sale rather than price increases. Before the last decades of the twentieth century, it is striking that there was relatively little public discussion of home prices.
As evidence for this, or as part of the reason for this, note that there was no regularly published and regularly cited price index for existing homes in the United States until , when the National Association of Real Estate Boards median price of existing homes rst began to be cited in major newspapers. Data on the price-rental ratio akin to the price-earnings ratio that is used by investors to test for over- or underpricing in the stock market did not begin to be stressed in the news media until the Economist began publishing them for various countries after Therefore, good public information about prices, information that might help generate irrational exuberance, was not really available until the close of the twentieth century.
Before then, newspaper accounts would sometimes talk of price changes, but they usually cited either anecdotal evidence or the opinions of real estate brokers about what was happening. Even those stories were infrequent, apparently re ecting lack of public interest in national home price trends. People were living in a less avowedly capitalist economy, and they were not primed to believe that their well-being depended in large measure on their property. Prior to the last decades of the twentieth century, public attention focused instead on rent control and on a housing cooperative movement, whereby groups of people would buy interest in an apartment building that they controlled as a group.
From these conspicuous examples of government and collective intervention in markets, people might plausibly have imagined that something would be done by authorities to prevent home prices from getting out of control. While rent control and housing cooperatives still exist, the idealistic ideology that created them is mostly gone. In recent decades, our increasing public commitment to market solutions to economic problems, rather than interventions and controls, has led people to worry more about the possible instability in home prices and hence to make them more prone to the kind of feedback that generates bubbles.
A Proquest search since and a Lexis-Nexis search since the s for the term housing bubble or home price bubble in English- language newspapers around the world shows that these terms were hardly used at all until just after the stock market crash a time when people were already talking about bubbles, and many countries were showing very rapid price increases , but those terms died out soon after The terms reappeared in the late s, and their use took o dramatically after Appearance in newspapers does not necessarily imply penetration into public awareness.
On paper questionnaires that Karl Case and I have been distributing to recent U. The printed questionnaires do not mention bubbles, nor do they ask directly about them. News stories referring to a housing bubble were especially frequent then.
This then suggests that the concept is not a natural one for most people, but that the idea had been planted in their minds by circumstances, media attention, and public talk, for a while. Life was simpler once; one saved and then bought a home when the time was right. The increasingly large role of speculative markets for homes, as well as of other markets, has fundamentally changed our lives. The price activity that was once very local and con ned to such events as the building of highways, canals, and railroads has become national and even international, and it is now connected to popular stories of new economic eras.
The changing behavior of home prices is a sign of changing public impressions of the value of property, a heightening of attention to speculative price movements. The Role of Lending Institutions in Housing Bubbles During a bubble, attentional anomalies tend to a ect lenders as well as buyers. They, too, focus their attention on the same investing opportunities.
They, too, are not attentive to—are complacent about —the risk of a collapse in the market. One of these lenders was Washington Mutual, Inc. WaMu , a savings bank holding company whose origins go back to the Washington National Building and Loan Investment Association in , which was renamed in the early twentieth century as the Washington Mutual Savings Bank.
It was a mutual a sort of cooperative, not for pro t , but dropped its mutual status in during the Reagan years of deregulation and became for-pro t. It lost its ideological roots and became a go-go success story by ignoring risks. It became the biggest savings and loan in the United States by aggressively pursuing borrowers. After the crisis, it became the biggest bank failure in U.
But during the boom years, the mood in the rm was that of tantalizing success and inattention to the possibility of a housing crisis that had not happened since the Great Depression. Countrywide Financial, under Angelo Mozilo, another mortgage lender whose boom and collapse gured largely in the nancial crisis, had a similar corporate culture.
The Path from Here In the next part of the book, I develop carefully a theory of bubbles, a theory that applies both to the stock market and to the housing market, and in fact to any speculative market. The theory acknowledges multiple causes for these phenomena; they have no simple, one-liner explanations.
And yet the theory also has a basic theoretical model, a model of feedback that is simple and indispensable for understanding how prices move. In later parts of this book I turn over and reexamine the theory of bubbles from a number of directions.
Part One. What ultimately caused the values of the stock markets in so many countries to rise dramatically from to the remarkable peak around ? Why, after two major corrections, are the values of these markets returning again at the time of this writing to those elevated levels?
What accounts for the long downtrend in real long-term interest rates in many countries over the past couple of decades? What ultimately caused the boom in real estate markets in so many cities around the world to follow the stock market boom? To answer these questions, and questions like them that will surely be generated in the future, it is not enough to say that the markets in general are vulnerable to bouts of irrational exuberance.
We must specify what precipitating factors from outside the markets themselves caused the markets to behave so dramatically. Most historical events, from wars to revolutions, do not have simple causes. More likely, it owed its fall to a plurality of factors—some large and some small, some remote and some immediate—that conspired together. This ambiguity is unsatisfying to those of us seeking scienti c certitude, especially given that it is so hard to identify and isolate the precipitating factors to begin with.
But that is the nature of history, and such ambiguity justi es the constant search for new and better information to expose at least the overall contours of causation. We have to resist the temptation to oversimplify by singling out only one. Anyway, long- term interest rates are not really exogenous factors. They are market phenomena determined by many of the same supply and demand factors that determine the level of prices in the stock market, and their behavior is part of the same market psychology that drives the stock market.
We have to try to understand the origins of market psychology itself. Understanding the factors that precipitate market moves is doubly di cult because the timing of the major market events tends not to be lined up well with the timing of the precipitating factors. But we must look at the precipitating factors if we are to understand why the market moves.
Those who predict avalanches look at snowfall patterns and temperature patterns over long periods of time before an actual avalanche event, even though they know that there may be no sudden change in these patterns at the time of an avalanche. It may never be possible to say why an actual avalanche occurred at the precise moment that it did. It is the same with the dramatic movements of stock markets and other speculative markets. Recognizing these limitations, let us look at a list of factors that might be o ered to help explain the increase in the value over the past twenty years of worldwide stock prices—and in some cases, of bond and real estate prices as well—as an exercise to help us understand what the future may hold.
These factors make up the skin of the bubble, if you will. I concentrate here mostly on factors that have had an e ect on the markets not warranted by rational analysis of economic fundamentals.
The list omits consideration of all the small variations in fundamental factors for example, the growth in earnings, the change in real interest rates that should rationally have an impact on nancial markets. In more normal times or in markets for individual stocks, such rational factors would assume relatively greater prominence in any discussion of changes in prices. In detailing these factors, I describe the reaction of the general public, not just of professional investment managers.
Some observers believe that professional investment managers are more sensible and work to o set the irrational exuberance of the nonprofessional investing public. There is in fact no clear distinction between professional institutional investors and individual investors, since the professionals routinely give advice to the individual investors. Some of these factors exist in the background of the market, including the advance of capitalism, the increased emphasis on business success, the revolution in information technology, the demographics of the Baby Boom, the decline of in ation and the economics of money illusion, and the rise of gambling and pleasure in risk taking in general.
Others operate in the fore-ground and shape the changing culture of investment. These include greatly increased media coverage of business, the aggressively optimistic forecasts of stock analysts, the rise of k plans, the mutual funds explosion, and the expanding volume of trade in the stock market.
Twelve Precipitating Factors That Propelled the Late Stages of the Millennium Boom, — In the rst edition of this book, published in —just before the stock market peak of that year—I listed twelve precipitating factors for the build-up of bullish psychology and of stock prices to enormous levels by the beginning of the year.
Here is the list as it was presented then, from the point of view of the zeitgeist of that time; some of these factors are still operative today, others less so. The World Wide Web rst appeared in the news in November The Mosaic web browser rst became available to the public in February Signi cantly large numbers of users did not discover the web until and later, marking the very years when the NASDAQ stock price index which was then even more heavily weighted toward startup high-tech stocks than it is today soared, tripling to the end of , and the price-earnings ratios took o into unprecedented territory.
Internet technology is unusual in that it is a source of entertainment and preoccupation for us all, indeed for the whole family. In this sense, it is comparable in importance to the personal computer or, before that, to television. In fact, the impression it conveys of a changed future is even more vivid than that produced when televisions or personal computers entered the home.
Using the Internet gives people a sense of mastery of the world. They can electronically roam the world and accomplish tasks that would have been impossible before. They can even put up a website and become a factor in the world economy themselves.
In contrast, the advent of television made them passive receivers of entertainment, and personal computers were used by most people before the Internet mainly as typewriters and high-tech pinball machines. Because of the vivid and immediate personal impression the Internet makes, people nd it plausible to assume that it also has great economic importance. It is much easier to imagine the consequences of advances in this technology than the consequences of, say, improved shipbuilding technology or new developments in materials science.
Most of us simply do not hear much about research in those areas. Spectacular U. Instead the earnings growth was attributed by analysts to a continuation of the slow recovery from the —91 recession, coupled with a weak dollar and strong foreign demand for U.
It could not have been the Internet that caused the growth in pro ts: the edgling Internet companies were not making much of a pro t yet. But the occurrence of pro t growth coincident with the appearance of a new technology as dramatic as the Internet created an impression among the general public that the two events were somehow connected.
Publicity linking these twin factors, the Internet boom and the pro t growth, was especially strong because of the advent of the year and the new millennium, a time of much optimistic discussion of the future. The Internet is, of course, an important technological advance in its own right, and it, as well as other developments in computer technology and robotics, does promise to have an unpredictable and powerful impact on our future. But one should question what impact the Internet and the computer revolution should have on the valuation of existing U.
New technology will always a ect the market, but should it really raise the value of existing companies, given that those existing companies do not have a monopoly on the new technology?
People might well have thought that still more new companies would appear in the future, in the United States and abroad, and these would compete with the companies in which they invested in the late s. What matters for a stock market boom is not, however, the reality of the Internet revolution, which is hard to quantify, but rather the public impressions that the revolution has created.
Public reaction is in uenced by the intuitive plausibility of Internet lore, and this plausibility is ultimately in uenced by the ease with which examples or arguments come to mind. If we are regularly spending time on the Internet, then these examples will come to mind very easily. Triumphalism and the Decline of Foreign Economic Rivals In the late s, before the peak in the stock markets, most other countries seemed to be imitating the Western economic system.
Communist China has been embracing market forces since the late s. Increasing tolerance of free markets in the Soviet Union culminated with the breakup of that nation in into smaller, market-oriented states. The world seemed to be swinging our way, and therefore it started to seem only natural that the U. These political events unfolded gradually after the bull market began in And the years after the start of the bull market witnessed the decline in the Japanese market after , the prolonged economic slump in Japan, and the Asian nancial crisis of —98, which coincided roughly with the dramatic burst of the U.
These foreign events might have been viewed as bad for the U. The weakening of a rival was thus viewed simplistically as good news. Cultural and Political Changes Favoring Business Success The soaring of the stock market during — was accompanied by a signi cant rise in materialistic values. The idea that investing in stocks is a road to quick riches developed a certain appeal to born-again materialists.
Stay-at-home mothers, who devote their lives to their families, become less admired, and this is part of the reason women joined the work force in increasing numbers.
This helped propel home prices. A decline in crime rates also, on the ip side, encouraged materialistic values by making people feel more secure, less worried that they would be robbed or physically harmed. Living in an ostentatious home was now more appealing. Fear of terrorism increased, but terrorists did not seem to strike wealthy people preferentially, and generally not in their homes.
The declining crime rates in the U. Note that materialistic values do not by themselves have any logical bearing on the level of the stock market. Whether or not people are materialistic, it is still reasonable to expect them to save for the future and to seek out the best vehicles for their savings.
But it is plausible that such feelings would in uence their demand for stocks, which have long held out at least the possibility of amassing substantial riches quickly. Moreover, such feelings have an unmistakable political impact, which in turn a ects the success of corporate investments. In , both houses became Republican though with a Democratic president, just as happened again in Sensing the changed public attitudes that had elected them, these lawmakers were much more pro-business than their Democratic predecessors had been.
This change in Congress boosted public con dence in the stock market because of a variety of controls that the legislature can exert over corporate pro ts and investor returns. Consider taxation. No sooner had the Republican Congress been seated in than proposals to cut the capital gains tax became prominent.
As soon as this cut was enacted, Congress talked of cutting rates further. A tax bill would have cut capital gains taxes still further, but President Clinton vetoed it. Anticipation of possible future capital gains tax cuts can have a favorable impact on the stock market, even when tax rates actually remain unchanged. From to , investors were widely advised to hold on to their long-term capital gains, not to realize them, until after the capital gains tax cut.
This had a strengthening e ect on the market. At the time of the capital gains tax cut, there was fear that investors who had been waiting to sell would do so and bring the market down, as had apparently happened after capital gains tax cuts in and Many of our ebooks are available through library electronic resources including these platforms:. The reputation of the financial industry could hardly be worse than it is today in the painful aftermath of the financial crisis.
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Payoff investigates the true nature of motivation, our partial blindness to the way it works, and how we can bridge this gap. With studies that range from Intel to a kindergarten classroom, Ariely digs deep to find the root of motivation—how it works and how we can use this knowledge to approach important choices in our own lives. Along the way, he explores intriguing questions such as: Can giving employees bonuses harm productivity?
Why is trust so crucial for successful motivation? What are our misconceptions about how to value our work? How does your sense of your mortality impact your motivation?
A fascinating journey into the hidden psychological influences that derail our decision-making, Sway will change the way you think about the way you think.
Why is it so difficult to sell a plummeting stock or end a doomed relationship? In Sway, renowned organizational thinker Ori Brafman and his brother, psychologist Rom Brafman, answer all these questions and more.
Every once in a while, a book comes along that not only challenges our views of the world but changes the way we think. If you have any contact with the market, even a retirement account, this story is happening to you. The Nobel laureate for economics analyzes the politics and economics of the central environmental issue of today and points the way to real solutions Climate change is profoundly altering our world in ways that pose major risks to human societies and natural systems.
We have entered the Climate Casino and are rolling the global-warming dice, warns economist William Nordhaus. But there is still time to turn around and walk back out of the casino, and in this essential book the author explains how. This edition of The Art of Public Speaking comes complete with a Touch-or-Click Table of Contents, divided by each chapter, and motivational public speaking imagery.
This book is a fantastic introduction to public speaking by the master of the art, Dale Carnegie. Public speaking is the process of speaking to a group of people in a structured, deliberate manner intended to inform, influence, or entertain the listeners. Murder for hire. Drug trafficking.
Money laundering.
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